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Abstract 
While the geographical and economic factors concerning the development of hub ports are 
widely described by a variety of scholars and professionals, there is no recognized 
methodology measuring the hub dependence of a given port, region, or country. Based on a 
20-years database of vessel movements, this paper proposes a methodology measuring hub 
dependence. North Korea offers a good case of a constrained economy facing dramatic 
internal and external pressures. Notably, the weight and geographical extent of its maritime 
connections are worth analysing because of its contrasted evolution from Soviet influence, 
geopolitical isolation, and growing trade due to economic reforms and increased foreign 
investments. The main results of this study show the spatial shift from long-distance calls to 
feeder calls: global foreland contraction, regionalization within Northeast Asia, and traffic 
concentration upon closest hubs of which South Korean ports. We conclude that hub 
dependence is a combination of local constraints and trade growth. The political implications 
of this phenomenon are explored, and a spatial model of hub dependence is proposed.  
Keywords: DPRK, Hub, Maritime network, North Korea, Port, Spatial model 
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Introduction 
The development of hub ports is by no means a recent phenomenon. Port 
concentration and selection, stemming from the strategies of main carriers, and technological 
changes in sea transport [1] [2] have resulted in traffic concentration among port systems 
worldwide [3]. This has led to considerable loss of traffic and related economic impacts for 
traditional trading ports. Measuring the degree of hub dependence is a major issue for several 
ports of the world, but there has been little efforts analysing the hub dependence of a given 
country, region, or port. Most studies describe unprecedented traffic growth at emerging hubs 
without assessing the degree to which existing trading ports are becoming hub dependent. 
Such a lack of studies is mainly caused by the absence of relevant datasets on inter-port 
traffics. Port authorities themselves ignore the detailed maritime origins and destinations of 
the ships, and freight forwarders do not release data on transport chains. Only estimations 
from the press give approximate figures of hub dependence such as the 80% of Indonesian 
traffics flows passing through Singapore and Malaysian ports [4]. Former quantitative 
approaches such as network analysis [5] [6] [7] and network connectivity [8] are difficult to 
apply systematically due to the volumes of data and the complex methodologies needed.  
As a result, most studies dealing with hub dependence are qualitative case studies, as 
seen in Indonesia [9], South China [10], post-Apartheid South Africa [11], and post-Soviet 
countries [12] [13] [14]. All authors highlight the reduced hub dependence on neighbouring 
transit ports (i.e. Singapore, Hong Kong, and Rotterdam) by attracting more direct calls of 
global ocean carriers. Conversely, Japanese ports are increasingly hub dependent on the South 
Korean ports of Busan and Gwangyang [15].  
In this paper, the Democratic People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereafter referred to 
as North Korea) provides a remarkable example of a constrained economy. The impact of this 
particular situation on port development and maritime trade is worth analysing. Although the 
 3 
North Korean transport system is dominantly continental, due to the influence of the soviet 
development model and to preferential trade relations with China and Russia, the activity of 
the eight trading ports, because they support all other trade relations, is a good indicator of the 
position of North Korea in the world economy (see figure 1).  
 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
 The main purpose of the study is: 
1. to propose a methodology for analysing the hub dependence of a given country; 
2. to determine which factors give birth to hub dependence in the case of North Korea; 
3. to contribute to the literature by proposing a three-stage model of hub dependence; 
4. to discuss the implications of hub dependence for port and economic development.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section introduces data source, 
methodology, and selected indicators assessing hub dependence. The second section presents 
a brief description of the North Korean economy and analyses the data for the study. The third 
section details more the economical and political conditions underlying the hub dependence 
of North Korean ports and it introduces a three-stage model of hub dependence as a base for 
comparison. Finally, conclusive remarks are given about the implications of the research for 
policy making and maritime studies.  
 
1. Measuring hub dependence 
1.1 Data sources 
Given the scarcity and poor quality of data on North Korean ports, recent studies have 
used independent sources [16]. Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit (LMIU) database is one 
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possible source to address inter-port issues. It covers approximately 80% of the world‟s 
merchant fleet and 70% of the world‟s trade volumes. The extraction of North Korea-related 
data from the original global database raises some important issues.  
First, vessel movements are collected by Lloyd‟s based on the continuous and daily 
circulation of the insured ships, regardless of the specific sailing schedules of shipping 
companies. The domination of bulk traffics and tramping in North Korea lowers the 
disadvantage of ignoring this information. Thus, the advantage of Lloyd‟s database is that it 
harmonizes the great complexity of movements, schedules, and periods. However, ports of 
origin cannot be distinguished from ports of destination; thus, trading ports cannot be 
distinguished from transit ports. Because most ships are used for multiple routes, it is 
impossible to evaluate the share of North Korea in the total movements of every ship. Also, 
the passage of a ship in a port does not mean that any cargo has been loaded or unloaded at 
this port. Yet, we assume that connecting North Korean ports has some influence on the 
overall circulation pattern of those vessels.  
Second, assessing hub dependence necessitates distinguishing direct from indirect 
relations between North Korean ports and other ports. We postulate that hub dependence 
should be measured at directly connected ports, although there is no clear evidence that feeder 
calls are always direct links. Direct relations form a first maritime ring (see figure 2) defined 
by previous and next ports of call; indirect relations form the rest of the movements, in the 
outer maritime ring. The outer maritime ring is used in this study as a surrogate for analysing 
the geographical extension of North Korean forelands. Traffic by inter-port link and by 
foreign port are calculated summing vessel capacities using slot capacities in Twenty-Foot 
Equivalent Units (TEUs) and commercial capacities in Deadweight Tons (DWTs)  
 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
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1.2 Methodology 
Connectivity is defined as an “aggregate measure of the extent to which the nodes of a 
network are linked (directly or indirectly) to other nodes” [17]. Connectivity differs from 
connexity: the former measures the whole network, while the latter measures one element of 
the network.  
Several indicators can be used to measure maritime connectivity and connexity using 
vessel movements (see table 1). Connectivity refers to the situation of North Korea in the 
global maritime system formed by the ships calling at its ports. It can be measured by the 
number of ports connected, or by the number of calls worldwide, through vessel movements. 
Connexity, on the other hand, measures traffic at individual ports or port groups realized by 
those vessels. Concentration is measured by the highest traffic share within the first maritime 
ring and by the Gini coefficient, as in previous studies of port concentration [18]. Our 
approach is original because it applies the Gini coefficient to external port connections rather 
than to a given port range or more classical, continental port system.  
The aim of this paper is to find some correspondence between the evolutions of the 
two maritime rings. Hub dependence manifests as one link becomes concentrated within a 
larger transport chain; it is derived from the quality of different elements of maritime systems, 
including ports and shipping companies. Multi-scalar changes in the maritime system will 
more or less influence the degree of hub dependence. There is no fixed threshold from which 
hub dependence should be defined. Thus, we assess hub dependence by comparing the 
extension and concentration of North Korea‟s first and outer maritime rings.  
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
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2. Evolution and distribution of North Korea’s maritime linkages 
2.1 General trends 
Following the Korean War (1950-1953) and separation from then-Republic of Korea 
(hereafter referred to as South Korea), the North Korean economy officially adopted the 
ideology of self-sufficiency while sustaining predominant commercial relations with China 
and the USSR, which were bordering neighbours. While the steady growth of the North 
Korean economy through the 1970s can be explained by massive investments in heavy 
industries and construction, it has been supported since by China and Russia. Such a system 
started to falter in the mid-1980s with the collapse of the USSR. Paradoxically, it is because 
of trade dependence that North Korea has become isolated and unable to modernize its 
transport and economic system. Without oil or capital, most activities, including agriculture, 
mining, and transport, have ceased since then [19]. In addition, the lack of investment in light 
industries and consumer goods, due to the priority given to heavy and defence industries, have 
prevented the development of a competitive advantage in the world economy [20]. The mid-
1990s accentuated this dramatic situation after the death of former president Kim Il-Sung, 
who was replaced with Kim Jeong-Il (1994-1996). Massive floods due to deforestation 
resulted in spreading famines, and the first nuclear crisis was condemned by the US with the 
Wassenaar Agreement (1996), putting a commercial embargo on North Korea.  
It is only since 2000 that signs of change have appeared, notably with the historical 
inter-Korean summit, economic reforms, foreign investments, and cooperation projects such 
as the Gaeseong Industrial Park [21]. The Mount Geumgang International Tourism-Free Zone 
has attracted many South Korean tourists. These expanding projects financed by South Korea 
have much better results than earlier projects, such as the Rajin-Seonbong Free-Trade Zone, 
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the Sinuiju Special 
Administrative Region, which have been limited due to politics and mismanagement [22].  
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Although broad evolutions of the North Korean economy are well addressed in various 
papers and official reports, there is a huge lack of information on the transport sector. Recent 
studies have estimated the domestic modal split [23] and the relative importance of sea 
transport in total trade [24]. Maritime trade in North Korea oscillated between 10% and 20% 
in the past two decades; this share has been quite stable except from a slight increase during 
the peak period of humanitarian aid in the late 1990s. 
 
2.1.1 Port development in North Korea 
Due to preferential landward transport and border trade with China and Russia, North 
Korea has neglected the development of maritime transport and of its ports, although it 
announced a development plan in 1961 to develop this sector. As a result, the ports and 
commercial fleet – mostly composed of small ships - have aged and deteriorated over time. 
Since the 1970s, only oil piers and warehouses have been built in the ports; there is a drastic 
lack of general cargo and container-related equipments. Excessive port entry fees and special 
permits required from foreign ships have resulted in high shipping costs to and from the 
country as well as prolonged berthing time. Also, the limited size of the North Korean market 
and the external pressures stemming from trade embargos make maritime transport 
imbalanced, with approximately half of all containers returning empty.  
However, some improvements at the Nampo and Rajin ports are underway through 
Chinese support [25], but many other South Korea-related projects concerning the Nampo, 
Wonsan, and Heungnam ports have failed due to politics. Per the inter-Korean summit of 
October 2007, the South Korean government plans to develop the Haeju port as a means to 
foster export-led growth from the nearby Gaeseong Industrial Complex.  
 
2.1.2 International trade and maritime transport 
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Traffic evolution by main commodities is the first step in the analysis of the maritime 
dynamics (see figure 3). General cargo occupies the largest capacity, because maritime 
transport in North Korea is used as a complement to land transport, which is mostly used for 
raw materials and bulky products [26].  
 
[Insert figure 3 about here] 
 
The two categories on which North Korea is the most dependent, general cargo and 
liquid bulk have declined more rapidly. The decline of liquid bulk traffic since 1987 is due to 
worsening relations with traditional Socialist partners that once provided oil in exchange of 
other goods. North Korea has not been able to purchase oil on the world market due to the 
lack of foreign currencies. The peak of liquid bulk traffic between 1998 and 2002 clearly 
indicates the effect of humanitarian aids, which is also the case for solid bulks. Bulk traffic 
has been more stable for two reasons. First, North Korea possesses enormous amounts of 
natural resources, such as sands, mine products, and ferrous and non-ferrous minerals that can 
be exported. Moreover, since the North Korean economic system is dominated by agriculture 
and heavy industries, it has continued purchasing low-valued goods on the world market, 
although it is estimated than only 20% of existing factories are still in operation [27]. Finally, 
container and roll-on / roll-off ships are of minor concern, due to the lack of container 
handling facilities in this country and to the limited trade, consumption, and production of 
finished and semi-finished products.  
A general look at the relative evolution of trade and shipping verifies the importance 
of sea transport for international trade. Figure 4 presents relative values based on 1985 figures 
for total international trade (US$) and total vessel capacity passing through North Korean 
ports (DWT).  
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[Insert figure 4 about here] 
 
Shipping activity has constantly declined. There are important differences with the 
evolution of international trade. First, the gap between trade evolution and shipping evolution 
indicates that trade has become increasingly land-based, due to the retreat of North Korea 
from the global economy and the trade embargo. Between 1987 and 1990, there is a sudden 
fall of oil shipments for which sea transport was the dominant mode, at a time of loosening 
ties with the Soviet Union and China. Between 2002 and 2006, most trade is mostly based on 
land transport as 80% of North Korean exports pass through the border city of Sinuiju. 
Conversely, the parallel growth of trade and shipping from 1998 to 2001 illustrates the peak 
of humanitarian aid imports. The short but noticeable peak of maritime activity between 2004 
and 2005 can be attributed to lower shipping costs between North Korea and South Korea, 
following an inter-Korean maritime agreement destined to liberalize the circulation of Korean 
ships.  
 
2.2 North Korea’s maritime connections 
2.2.1 Global contraction of maritime forelands 
The analysis of vessel movements provides a detailed snapshot of North Korea‟s 
global maritime connectivity. Three periods are retained to obtain a clearer view of the 
different situations, since they are relevant for the study: pre-USSR collapse (1985-1991), 
isolation and crisis (1992-1998), aid, economic reforms, foreign investments, and inter-
Korean cooperation (1999-2006). 
During the first period, North Korea‟s foreland extension is relatively wide, reflecting 
its belonging to the Socialist block through the Europe-Asia link (figure 5a). Ports having 
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high connexity are pivotal nodes connecting the different sub-regions, such as Istanbul for the 
Black Sea, Gibraltar, Port Said, Suez, and Aden for Europe, Singapore and Hong Kong for 
connecting Europe with Asia, and Panama for accessing Latin America, of which Cuba. 
Geographically closer countries such as India, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Indonesia also 
concentrated a strong proportion of connexity during this period. The period from 1992 to 
1998 marked the end of North Korea‟s long distance trades, which were dominated by 
relations within the Socialist block (figure 5b). Ports that sustained relations with North Korea 
during this period concentrated within East Asia (e.g. Japan, China, Russia) and South Asia 
(e.g. India, Indonesia, Philippines). Almost all connections outside of East Asia have 
disappeared. From 1999 to 2006, there has been a huge increase of vessel movements (figure 
5c). Although most connections still concentrate within Northeast Asia, some have spread 
outside Asia, as reflected in the high connexity of some strategic European passages such as 
Gibraltar, Tarifa, Cape Finisterre, and the Dover Strait.  
 
[Insert figures 5a, 5b, 5c about here] 
 
Based on the data, calculating connexity shares by main regional area allows 
confirming some main trends from 1985 to 2006. For instance, Asia as a whole increased 
from 63% to 93%, which indicates the global contraction of North Korea‟s maritime 
connectivity. Within Asia, Northeast Asia increased from 38% to 71%, while Middle East 
decreased from 5.2% to 0.6%. This confirms the contraction of foreland towards proximate 
neighbours, and the inability purchasing oil products on the world market. Europe decreased 
from 18.8% to 2.9%, notably due to the disappearance of relations with the Black Sea, a key 
trading area of the USSR (from 6.8% to 0.2%). Important gateways to Soviet hinterlands, 
which were once well connected, are not connected anymore after 1991, such as Odessa, 
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Yuzhnyy, Illichivsk, Nikolayev, Rostock, Wismar, Szczecin-Swinoujscie, Gdansk, Gdynia, 
Constanta, Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Bourgas, and Varna. Decrease is also dramatic for other 
brother countries situated in Latin America (from 2.8% to 0.1%) and Africa (from 9.1% to 
1.2%), such as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, and Algeria [28]. It also indicates the 
loosening of long-distance connections with the two strategic canals (Suez, Panama).  
 
2.2.2 Regional concentration of traffic 
The concentration of traffic and vessel movements regionally is one important element 
leading to hub dependence. We hypothesize that the loss of long-distance direct calls explains 
the regional lock-in of vessel movements within Northeast Asia. To shed light on this 
phenomenon, we calculated the share of the first maritime ring (direct links) in total 
connectivity (total links). The higher the share of the first maritime ring, the more likely is the 
concentration of traffic within neighbouring transit ports. This concentration conditions the 
emergence of hub dependence. In figure 6, the two indicators are relatively proximate during 
the first period (1985-1991), but there is a growing gap between them in the second period 
(1992-1998). Long distance calls and services have been gradually replaced by short-sea 
movements, and traffic has become more geographically dispersed. The dramatic decrease of 
trade flows prevents from connecting important transit ports such as Singapore or Hong 
Kong. Instead, traffic is distributed more evenly through small shipments among the closest 
ports. The third period shows an inversion with higher traffic concentration and increased 
importance of the outer maritime ring. Traffic in the latter has been reactivated due to 
humanitarian aids (1999-2001) and to real trade at a time of economic reforms and foreign 
investments, notably with the European Union (2002-2006) [29]. This means that fewer ports 
tend to ensure North Korea‟s connection with the outer maritime ring. In the end, results show 
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that traffic concentration is more likely to occur in a period of foreland extension than in a 
period of foreland contraction.  
 
[Insert figure 6 about here]  
 
The application of the Gini coefficient provides a useful verification of such 
phenomenon (figure 7) [30]. Two trends are highlighted: decrease and increase. Although port 
concentration has existed before 1991, the crisis provoked dispersion in the first maritime ring 
until concentration reappeared gradually and at a higher level. Remote pivotal transit ports 
situated in areas outside of Northeast Asia were disconnected from North Korea and were 
replaced by closer transit hubs with higher concentration. Thus, there was a shift from remote 
hubs to neighbouring hubs. This shockwave altering the spatial pattern of trade relations and 
vessel circulations constitutes strong evidence of hub dependence. In the recent period, only a 
few direct connections concentrate most of North Korea‟s maritime traffic. Regional 
proximity is indeed a main component of hub dependence.  
 
 [Insert figure 7 about here] 
 
Such trends indicate the close relation between the dimension of forelands‟ 
geographical coverage and traffic concentration. This results from local constraints such as 
derelict port infrastructures, trade embargo, war risk, and political tension with the outside 
world. Despite positive economical factors in the recent period, the spatial distribution of 
maritime connections is still constrained by technical and political factors. For instance, long-
distance direct calls and large vessels may not ship at North Korean ports despite international 
trade. Only feeder vessels are likely to access North Korean ports, a very contrasting picture 
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with the one pre-1991. Such evidence may be sufficient assessing hub dependence which is 
not only a matter of maritime traffic but also has strong political implications. However, a 
closer look at the ports upon which North Korea has become hub dependent is necessary.  
 
3. South Korea as North Korea’s main hub 
3.1 Centrality and intermediacy of South Korean ports 
 When zooming on the distribution of North Korea-related container traffics measured 
in slot capacities within Northeast Asia, there is a clear trend towards concentration at South 
Korean ports in the recent period (see figure 8). The dominance of Incheon may be explained 
by its more favourable location connecting the Nampo-Pyongyang corridor that concentrates 
most of North Korea‟s population, factories, and foreign investments [31]. Thus, Incheon has 
replaced Dalian as the leading hub in the Yellow Sea, while Busan has overthrown Japanese 
ports for transhipment between Northeast Asia and the rest of the world [32]. This confirms 
the general properties of transportation hubs [33] [34], since South Korean ports combine a 
good centrality and good intermediacy.  
 Several explanations can be given to the rise of South Korea as the leading hub. First, 
90% of the continuously growing inter-Korean trade occurs through sea transport due to the 
blockage at the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two Koreas. In addition, the successful 
economic cooperation projects following the inter-Korean summit required important 
shipments of raw materials and manufactured goods to build and start, notably, the Gaeseong 
Industrial Park. In order to facilitate sea transport, institutional arrangements such as the inter-
Korean maritime agreement (2004) focused on opening new sea routes and fostering inter-
Korean port cooperation, resulting in the agreement between Incheon and Nampo (2005) for 
regular ferry and container services. One should not forget the advantageous situation of 
South Korea as a pivotal hub allowing optimizing the servicing of both east and west coasts of 
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the peninsula, in a context of maritime network reorganization of interested shipping lines in 
Northeast Asia [35]. This position is backed by the recent policy of South Korea to become 
Northeast Asia‟s logistics hub, based upon the new role of Incheon‟s Pentaport within the 
Yellow Sea, and the double hub of Busan and Gwangyang aiming at reducing competition 
from rapidly growing Chinese ports [36]. As a result, we have calculated that about 90% of all 
containers going to (and coming from) North Korean ports have passed through South Korean 
ports in recent years.  
 This analysis shows the close connection between spatial, economical and political 
factors in the emergence of South Korea as North Korea‟s hub. Since this phenomenon is 
relatively new, it needs further study by looking at the hub dependence degrees of the 
different North Korean ports.  
 
[Insert figure 8 about here] 
 
3.2 The variability of hub dependence 
 Hub dependence also varies from one port to another based on local trade routes and 
the resilience of maritime systems to geopolitical change [37]. For the three periods, we 
calculate the share of main direct external connections for every North Korean port, inbound 
and outbound (see table 2).  
Traffic concentration at South Korean ports has become dominant for a few ports, of 
which Haeju (93% inbound and 96% outbound), Heungnam (50% inbound and 60% 
outbound), Cheongjin (30% outbound), and Songjin (52% outbound). For Haeju, the high hub 
dependence may be explained by recent agreement on sand extraction and barging at the 
mouth of the Han River. In the case of Heungnam and Cheongjin, aid shipments are a large 
component of the flows, since the two ports are isolated from the rest of the country due to the 
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dereliction of the transport system [38]. For other North Korean ports, the hub dependence on 
South Korean ports remains lower, but it increased rapidly.  
Some North Korean ports tend to sustain long-distance direct connections reaching 
outside Northeast Asia. Such linkages still dominate in the recent period for Cheongjin (37% 
inbound) and Songjin (50% inbound), showing the importance of international trade over hub 
dependence. These ports usually locate nearby large cities (Cheongjin), large hinterlands and 
industrial complexes (Nampo-Pyongyang), or are situated close to cooperation projects (e.g. 
KEDO project for Songjin; Rajin-Seonbong Free-Trade Zone). Therefore, ports which 
maintain some economic activity are more likely to prevent from hub dependence upon South 
Korea.  
Finally, we observe a regional specialization of maritime linkages. For instance, 
Eastern ports keep important relations with Russia (e.g. Rajin, 57% outbound) and Japan 
(Wonsan, 48% inbound and 56% outbound due to the ferry link with Niigata). Even for some 
ports, Japanese traffics are still dominant, as for Cheongjin (38% outbound), Wonsan, but also 
Nampo (30% inbound and 34% outbound) that is located on the West coast. This occurs 
despite the declining trade between North Korea and Japan and the banning of North Korean 
ships from Japanese ports.  
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
3.3 Towards a model of hub dependence in port systems? 
Based on the North Korean experience, a three-stage evolutional model of hub 
dependence is proposed in figure 9. The first stage represents a trading port (or country) that 
connects to other remote trading ports through mostly direct calls. It has a dominant position 
regionally (load centre) since it does not depend on neighbouring transit ports and acts as a 
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hub towards other trading ports. The second stage shows the concentration of direct calls at 
the first maritime ring, before and after accessing the trading port. The latter becomes a 
secondary port although it manages to sustain its position in the port system by welcoming as 
many direct calls as the competing hub ports. In the last stage, the secondary port becomes a 
peripheral port because it connects to the rest of the world through one main hub, which 
receives the majority of direct calls of larger vessels. While this peripheral port sustains some 
links with other neighbouring ports, it is not able to handle its own trade flows: those are split 
among smaller vessels accessing the main hub through feeder services. The model cannot 
encompass the wide diversity of local situations and problems that contribute to hub 
dependence, because they greatly vary in nature and scope (e.g. geographical location, lack of 
space, handling costs, congestion, etc.). Also, the three stages may be in reality slightly 
overlapped rather than strictly delimitated. As in the North Korean case, hub dependence 
occurs while some ports maintain long-distance connections.  
In cases other than North Korea, such a model may also help understanding how 
peripheral ports become load centres. Shenzhen ports gradually relieved their hub dependence 
from Hong Kong over time [39]. They have become load centres welcoming direct calls from 
most of the world‟s main ocean carriers, thus bypassing Hong Kong‟s predominance as a hub 
port. In the case of Japanese ports, the national port policy seems intentionally avoid the 
development of hub functions within Japan, since this costly, space consuming, and low-
benefit function is already developed in neighbouring countries [40]. Despite the variety of 
regional port systems, this model may help to reveal interesting discrepancies among trading 
ports according to their level of hub dependence.  
 
[Insert figure 9 about here] 
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Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated the economic factors and spatial mechanisms giving birth 
to hub dependence in the case of a constrained economy. An original methodology based on 
vessel movements provides a geographical pattern that improves understanding of shipping 
line behaviour on various scales. The shift from long-distance to short-sea shipping is 
measured through the evolution of direct and indirect maritime relations with foreign ports. 
Hub dependence is a combination of trade growth and local constraints. In the case of North 
Korea, hub dependence is the consequence of a period of economic decline accentuated by 
political tensions, which were partly overcome by recent economic reforms and increased 
foreign investments. However, hub dependence may greatly vary within a single country, as it 
demonstrated by Russia, Japan, China, and South Korea. Notably, hinterland size and regional 
proximity are strong factors that reduce the hub dependence on South Korean ports. 
In terms of policy outcomes, the results need further discussion. For instance, it may 
appear rather surprising that South Korea has become North Korea‟s maritime hub. 
Discussions with South Korean officials and economic players [41] involved in North Korean 
development indicate that traffic concentration at South Korean ports is probably a self-
organizing process resulting from port selection by the shipping lines and this was not 
planned either by South Korean or North Korean decision-makers. Although China is North 
Korea‟s main trade partner and exerts a growing influence on North Korea‟s development, 
Chinese ports are not well located for developing hub-feeder networks with North Korea. 
Therefore, hub dependence is based on economic rather than political factors because it 
reflects the consequence of local constraints on port selection. Overlapping behaviours of 
multiple shipping companies reveal which port is best located in terms of centrality and 
intermediacy. Such methodology may be applied elsewhere to evaluate the impact of port 
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planning on foreland extension. Notably, countries and ports that are willing to measure their 
hub dependence may benefit from such research agenda.  
Whether North Korea‟s hub dependence on South Korean ports is related to South 
Korea‟s strategy of becoming Northeast Asia‟s logistics hub still needs to be demonstrated, 
but still there a striking coincidence between the two phenomena. Is hub dependence a 
temporary phenomenon that is likely to disappear with port modernization and market 
development? In fact, North Korea‟s hub dependence may either increase or decrease in the 
future depending on the worsening or the betterment of the country‟s economy and transport 
system. More economic growth and the development of export-based industries will face the 
limitations of road, rail, and port infrastructures internally, leading to increased hub 
dependence externally. However, improving port facilities may not be sufficient to solve 
wider issues of which trade embargo and cumbersome regulations in North Korean ports. 
Without a peace treaty with South Korea negotiated with the US, progress will be slow, 
irregular, and fastidious.  
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Table 1: Selected indicators 
Type of indicator Calculation method Geographical level 
Concentration 
Maximum percentage of traffics among ports 
directly connected to North Korean ports through 
vessel movements 
First maritime ring 
Gini coefficient applied to foreign ports directly 
connected to North Korean ports through vessel 
movements 
First maritime ring 
Connectivity 
Number of connections (e.g. ports, calls) realized 
by vessels which have included North Korean 
ports in their yearly movements 
First maritime ring, 
Maritime region, World 
Connexity 
Number of vessel calls by port directly or indirectly 
connected to North Korean ports through the 
yearly movements of vessels 
Port 
Source: author 
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Table 2: Distribution of direct maritime connections of North Korean ports by country and period, 1985-
2006 (Unit: % DWT) 
Port Country 
Inbound Outbound 
1985-1991 1992-1998 1999-2006 1985-1991 1992-1998 1999-2006 
Cheongjin 
Japan 50.4 44.9 25.8 59.4 54.6 38.1 
China 14.1 21.0 7.5 16.3 10.6 5.0 
South Korea 0.8 7.7 27.2 1.0 19.7 29.8 
Russia 0.3 2.0 2.5 0.0 7.1 7.8 
Other 34.5 24.4 36.9 23.3 8.0 19.3 
Haeju 
Japan 18.7 49.2 2.7 29.6 77.7 3.7 
China 50.4 21.2 2.2 30.3 17.2 0.2 
South Korea 2.0 15.2 92.7 2.1 0.8 96.1 
Russia 1.8 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 27.1 10.2 2.4 38.0 4.3 0.0 
Heungnam 
Japan 33.2 33.0 11.2 46.3 41.1 13.9 
China 17.5 18.3 6.4 10.5 10.9 8.3 
South Korea 2.9 7.8 55.5 1.6 19.9 60.0 
Russia 1.2 3.1 3.7 0.5 1.0 3.3 
Other 45.2 37.8 23.2 41.1 27.1 14.5 
Nampo 
Japan 37.2 39.1 29.5 43.9 51.3 33.8 
China 28.4 27.6 17.4 28.6 26.0 19.9 
South Korea 3.4 7.5 24.8 4.4 7.2 30.3 
Russia 0.2 1.2 2.2 0.2 0.6 2.6 
Other 30.8 24.6 26.1 22.9 14.9 13.4 
Rajin 
Japan 54.8 40.4 43.1 61.8 69.3 32.8 
China 11.4 13.3 2.3 32.8 7.7 1.5 
South Korea 2.3 6.5 4.8 0.0 1.2 6.1 
Russia 17.7 17.3 37.1 2.2 6.2 57.2 
Other 13.8 22.5 12.7 3.2 15.6 2.4 
Songjin 
Japan 11.1 50.2 15.0 11.1 50.2 28.4 
China 0.0 8.0 0.0 41.0 0.0 3.3 
South Korea 0.0 0.0 26.9 0.0 8.0 52.3 
Russia 0.0 7.7 7.8 0.0 7.7 9.1 
Other 88.9 34.1 50.3 47.9 34.1 6.9 
Wonsan 
Japan 48.7 61.2 48.2 61.0 66.6 55.6 
China 2.0 16.4 2.3 1.9 3.8 3.9 
South Korea 36.5 6.2 23.7 26.6 9.2 23.7 
Russia 0.0 5.5 10.6 0.1 6.4 15.3 
Other 12.8 10.7 15.2 10.4 14.0 1.5 
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Figure 1: The North Korean transport system 
 
Source: author, compiled from various sources 
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Figure 2: A geographical framework for analyzing hub dependence 
 
Source: author 
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Figure 3: Traffic evolution at North Korean ports by main commodity, 1985-2006 (Unit: 000s DWT) 
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Sources: author, calculated from Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit (LMIU) 
N.B. Bold colour indicates values higher than the row’s average 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of North Korean international trade and shipping, 1985-2006 (Base 1985=100) 
 
Sources: author, calculated from Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) and Lloyd‟s Marine 
Intelligence Unit (LMIU) 
N.B. Total trade in 2006 comprises only trade with China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and Germany 
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Figures 5a, 5b, 5c: Distribution of vessel movements connecting North Korean ports by port and period, 
1985-2006 (Unit: Number of calls) 
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Source: author, calculated from Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
N.B. Each map retains only the ports which have realized at least one third of their total calls during the period 
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Figure 6: Relative importance and traffic concentration of North Korea’s first maritime ring, 1985-2006 
 
Source: author, calculated from Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
 
 
Figure 7: Gini coefficient applied to North Korea’s first maritime ring, 1985-2005 
 
Source: author, calculated from Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
N.B. (a) same 78 directly connected ports (b) all directly connected ports 
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Figure 8: Direct connections of North Korean ports within Northeast Asia by port and period (Unit: 
TEUs) 
 
Source: author, calculated from Lloyd‟s Marine Intelligence Unit 
N.B. Container traffics correspond to the sum of slot capacities in TEUs 
 
Figure 9: A three-stage model of hub dependence 
 
Source: author 
 
